

Catching a Second Wave: Context and Compatibility in Advisory System Dynamics

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“Policy advisory systems” have been central to moving beyond individual actor considerations to assessments of the interactive effects of multiple interlocking sets of suppliers, in specific jurisdictions, that provide policy advice to policymakers. This article argues, while useful, the advisory system concept should be revised given that previous approaches animated by the location of supply and government control over it have been weakened. We argue for a “second wave” of advisory system studies that: (1) reorients the unit of analysis from the public service to advisory systems themselves, (2) better contextualizes advisory system operation and dynamics based on the subsystems within which they operate, and (3) focuses on questions of why advisory system components combine in particular policy instances and with what effect. Using access and compatibility, we posit a typology of policy advisory networks and develop four archetypes of policy ideational compatibility.

KEY WORDS: policy advice, policy theory, public management, subsystems, context

Introduction

Policy advice continues to occupy a prized position in public management and policy. As fields of study and practice both retain a keen interest in understanding the nature and function of policy advice within the public sector (Di Francesco, 2001; Raudla, 2013; Scott & Baehler, 2010). The study of policy advice has evolved from an initial emphasis on individual professional public service analysts (Jenkins-Smith, 1982; Meltzer, 1975, 1979) to examinations of the “policy advisory systems”; that is, to the interlocking set of actors and organizations, with a unique configuration in each sector and jurisdiction, that provides recommendations for action to policymakers (Halligan, 1995; Seymour-Ure, 1987). This better recognizes a broader category of policy workers, beyond professional policy analysts within government, that are potential advisers on policy matters. Consultants, scientists, political advisers, think tanks, and nongovernmental organizations are examples of the constellation of potential advisory system participants (Bakvis, 1997; Colebatch, 2015; Craft, 2015a; Howlett, Tan, Migone, Wellstead, & Evans, 2014). These systems helpfully recognize

that a number of policy advisory components exist (e.g., types of policy advisers, of advice, and advisory practices) and important distinctions can characterize their respective configurations and operation in various jurisdictions (Boston, 1994; Hoppe & Jeliaskova, 2006; Mayer, Bots, & Van Daalen, 2004; Page & Jenkins, 2005; Van Damme, Brans, & Fobé, 2011). Additionally, advisory systems facilitate a dynamic and interactive frame for understanding how these advisory components interact and how such systems may themselves change over time (Aberbach & Rockman, 1989; Craft & Howlett, 2013a).

Early or “first-wave” approaches relied on conceptual distinctions between the supply of policy advice as originating from “inside” or “outside” government. We argue it is time to move to a “second wave” of advisory system studies that views this boundary as blurred. Given the prevalence of collaboration and coordination among the state, market actors, and civil society in contemporary governance (Kjaer, 2004; Torfing, Peters, Pierre, & Sørensen, 2011), a framework that goes beyond the inside–outside dichotomy and degrees of government “control” over supply promises more theoretical and empirical leverage. The second-wave approach: (1) reorients the unit of analysis from an emphasis on the public service toward the broader advisory system itself, (2) contextualizes advisory system operation by linking their dynamics to the policy subsystem within which they operate, and (3) better theorizes and empirically examines why advisory system components combine in particular policy domains or at particular conjunctures, and with what effects.

The article begins with a succinct review of first-wave advisory-system literature. This includes attention to early market-like supply/demand conceptions of advice systems, the emphasis on location and proximity of suppliers to decision makers, and the control or autonomy of policy advice from government decision makers. The significance and shortcomings of these first-wave concepts are then set out for policy and management theory. Subsequently, using policy subsystem logic, the case for a second wave of advisory system scholarship is advanced along the three lines detailed above. Using the twin dimensions of “accessibility” and “policy ideational compatibility,” a typology of advisory networks is developed to capture potential domain-specific dynamics expected of these systems. “Accessibility” more accurately represents the dynamics associated with structural characteristics long used to parse advisory system components, typically by location. It reorients concerns from questions linked to the provenance of advice, to determinations of whether that advice has access at the policy subsystem level (Howlett & Ramesh, 1998; Zahariadis & Allen, 1995). The second dimension, “policy ideational compatibility,” better depicts the dynamics imbued in notions of alignment through supply/demand matching and control-autonomy prominent in first-wave approaches; that is, whether and why policy advice is (a)symmetrical with prevailing policy subsystem objectives. Approaches often continue to be rooted in a logic that there is a “fit” or alignment between advice and its use (Lindquist, 2009; New Zealand (Treasury), 2010; Prasser, 2006b), but the compatibility dynamics driving that congruence often remain unspecified and do not clearly delimit the possible variations. We propose four archetypal forms of policy ideational compatibility to more clearly set out a range of

empirical possibilities based on: advisory content, purpose, issue type, and relational considerations.

This article provides a more theoretically informed approach to the *context*¹ within which these systems operate, and policy advisory work unfolds. From this perspective, it is the interactions between the actors and the cohesiveness of the sub-system that is crucial, not the proximity of advisory supply to decision makers. For public policy and management scholars, this facilitates improved analysis of policy domain level dynamics that are lacking in existing approaches. It may be intuitive to expect advisory system dynamics to differ at the domain level (e.g., defense, tourism). This article provides new and specific avenues for improved theory building and empirical testing regarding how the constituent units of advisory systems intersect and interact in particular domains, and why some policy advice has purchase and is compatible at the domain level.

"First-Wave" Approaches: Spatial and Control-Autonomy Logics

Policy advice has typically been operationalized in two ways, in broad terms in keeping with knowledge utilization (Dunn, 2004; MacRae & Whittington, 1997; Peters & Barker, 1993; Webber, 1991) or more narrowly in relation to the policy formulation in government (Halligan, 1998; James & Jorgensen, 2009; Scott & Baehler, 2010). Early or first-wave conceptual models of policy advice relied heavily on spatial logic to depict and evaluate advice giving as a kind of tripartite marketplace for policy knowledge more generally. Typically, this involved a supply, its demand on the part of decision makers, and various potential intermediary brokers who match supply and demand. In these frameworks, advisory-system components are typically arrayed into a few general "sets" or "communities" (Dunn, 1980; Sundquist, 1978). "Knowledge producers" were depicted as the variously located actors and organizations that provide the basic scientific and social scientific data upon which analyses are often used to inform decisions. Studies identified a range "knowledge producers" including but not limited to academics, think tanks, and research institutes, along with scientific and statistical agencies within this category (Dunn, 1980; Weiss, 1986). "Proximate decision makers" are those who serve as consumers of policy advice and who are the authorized decision makers. This category would include elected officials and bodies, such as cabinets, executives, legislators, or senior officials with delegated or statutory authority. The third set of actors, "brokers," were depicted as intermediaries who facilitate the exchange and circulation of policy-relevant information or advice, and "repackage" or "translate" data and information into usable forms of policy knowledge for decision makers (Craft, 2013; Lee, 2013; Lindvall, 2009; Sabatier, 1987; Verschuere, 2009). By this logic, policy influence was a construct based on the proximity of policy advice to government decision makers (Vesely, 2013; Wilson, 2006).

In a review of the impact of successive public management reforms in Anglo-American systems, Halligan (1995) combined longstanding spatial considerations with "government control" as a key variable affecting advisory system operation and influence. Working from the second definitional perspective policy advice was

defined in problem oriented and instrumental policymaking terms as “covering analysis of problems and the proposing of solutions” (Halligan, 1998, p. 1686). In this sense, it consists of more than the provision of data or information in that it included analysis and preference ordering of some kind.² Halligan’s analysis drew attention to the broader potential range of professional and personal advisory units, how they may be combined in various ways, and how these systems might change over time, as well as related implications for policymaking and public management. As per Table 1, his approach takes into account the observation that only some actors, be they internal or external, are able to influence policymaking but not others.

At its core, this approach is, however, still based on the insider–outsider logic, as governments, generally, were thought to be able to exercise more control over internal actors than external ones. Halligan (1995), however, usefully noted that in all categories, some actors were more susceptible to government control than others and hence more likely to articulate advice that decision makers would find acceptable. That is, matching their perceptions of best practices, feasibility, and appropriate goals and means for achieving them (Majone, 1989; May, 1986; Webber, 1986). This reflects many of the underlying market-like principles noted above in attending to questions of demand. However, each of these control categories remains “nested” within a locational one. The extent of independence and autonomy enjoyed by those “inside” government advisory components is considerably less than that enjoyed by an “outside” actor. This is the case whether or not that external actor, or policy advice, is amenable to government direction. Several studies have found endogenous and exogenous public management and policymaking pressures have had significant effects on advisory systems (e.g., internationalization and globalization, fiscal pressures, agencification, and various forms of public sector reorganization and reform) (Christensen & Laegreid, 2007; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). These various changes along with the growing diversity of advisory inputs, have been part of a broader pattern of change that calls into question early tenets of the supply, demand, and interaction of variously located advisory inputs (Brans, Pelgrims, & Hoet, 2006; Craft & Howlett, 2013; Tiernan, 2011).

Indeed, these systemic dynamics have received some attention given the widespread agreement that a plurality of external forms of policy advice has, to varying degrees, displaced the “internal” and particularly public service advisory components. Policy advisory landscapes are now depicted as more contested, dotted by a constellation of advisory supplies and practices that challenge the orthodox notions of advisory production, brokerage, and consumption (Bevir & Rhodes, 2001; Bevir, Rhodes, & Weller, 2003; Howlett & Lindquist, 2004; Lee, 2013; Mayer et al., 2004; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2011; Parsons, 2004), the consensus being that in most instances decision makers now sit in complex webs of advisory activity which include both “traditional” professional public service analysts; political advisors inside and outside of government; and an assortment of “expert,” professional, and other less formal types of advice (Bakvis, 1997; Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010; Rudder, 2008; Stone, 2007; Weller, 1987).

How advisory systems themselves evolve and change is directly pertinent to the study and practice of public management and public policy. For instance,

Table 1. Location/Control-Autonomy Advisory System Approach

Location	Government Control	
	High	Low
Public service	Senior departmental policy advisers Central agency advisers/ strategic policy unit	Statutory appointments in public service
Internal to government	Political advisory systems Temporary advisory policy units • Ministers' Offices • First Ministers' Offices Parliaments (e.g., a House of Commons)	Permanent advisory policy units Statutory authorities Legislatures (e.g., U.S. Congress)
External	Private sector/NGOS on contract Community organizations subject to government Federal international organizations	Trade unions, interest groups Community groups Confederal international communities/ organizations

Source: Halligan (1995).

management scholars have for some time now associated attempts to broaden and diversify available policy advisory supplies with managerial and public sector reforms falling under the banner of New Public Management (NPM). These are directly linked to the divisions of labor among political-administrative elites (Brans et al., 2006; Page & Wright, 2007), public sector organizational (re)design, and policy analysis and management techniques predicated on notions of competition and efficiency (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; Osbourne, 2010; Pollitt & Talbot, 2004). For policy theorists, this deinstitutionalization dynamic squarely challenges long-held views that understand policy formulation as restricted to a narrow group of authorized and resourced policy actors (Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009; Mara, 2007). Moreover, it suggests important shifts in advisory practices themselves, namely from traditional bilateral politico-administrative “speaking truth to power” modes (Wildavsky, 1979) to those characterized by “weaving” or “sharing of truths with multiple actors of influence” (Parsons, 2004; Prince, 2007; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007).

Additionally, these dynamics raise questions as to differences and effects tied to the content, or substantive nature of the policy advice circulating (Craft & Howlett, 2012; Prasser, 2006a). This is well reflected by the longstanding normative and operational public management debates as to the optimality and tensions of “neutral” versus “responsive” public service competence (Aberbach & Rockman, 1994; O’Toole & Meier, 2006; West, 2005). Public service advice in such debates is often depicted as involving “objective,” technical, evidentiary, “expert”—and typically but not exclusively nonpartisan³—advisory content (Dluhy, 1981; Montpetit, 2011; Radin, 2000; Weller, 1987). Similarly, the pertinence is well documented by the successive public management reforms explicitly aimed at reasserting political control and increasing public service responsiveness (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; Dahlström, Peters, & Pierre, 2011; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). Deinstitutionalization then is not only tied to the growing availability of extra-public service advisory units, but also in part linked to attempts by various actors to seek out advisory content that was either unavailable

or not forthcoming (Boston, 1994; Di Francesco, 2000; Raudia, 2013). The predominance of the public service as central if not sole unit of analysis in first-wave advisory studies has, therefore, limited analysis of variance in advisory content-based dynamics in particular policy sectors (Prince, 1983), or its relationship vis-à-vis the configuration and operation of *entire* advisory systems. Additional conceptual and empirical study is needed to illuminate individual and aggregate component dynamics, and their effect on advisory system operation and optimality. Together, these gaps sketch out opportunities to advance a second wave of scholarship. Through an agenda that refocuses attention to the dynamics of the systems *themselves*, the *context* within which they operate, and seeks to understand *which* subsidiary components are “active” or configured in particular ways and *why*.

Catching a “Second Wave”: Unit of Analysis, Context(s), and Content Specification

With the public service as the unit of analysis, advisory system scholarship has focused almost exclusively on the politicization and deinstitutionalization of public service supplies (Craft & Howlett, 2013a; Pierre, 1998; Saint-Martin, 2005; Veselý, 2013). We argue this omits other important dynamics and call for a reorientation of the unit of analysis to the advisory system *itself*, which includes but extends beyond the public service. Advisory systems provide fruitful lines of inquiry for assessing how such systems influence policy processes and outcomes, why they remain stable or decay, how they operate *in toto*, and why certain configurations of their components prevail in particular policy sectors, jurisdictions, or at particular conjunctures. This is not to suggest that the study of public service as a participant in such systems is no longer important. Rather, our aim is to acknowledge that advisory system dynamics are not solely a product of the public service, which reflects the widespread recognition that advisory and governance arrangements typically involve a diversity of actors (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012; Peters, 2014). In contrast to the inside-outside dichotomy of first-wave approaches, the second wave recognizes this boundary is blurred, with the overlap between multiple, competing, and interacting sources of advice providing opportunities for learning and synthesis between advisory units. Further, we contend that policy advice is not restricted to formulation activity alone. Rather, it is an activity that applies to a range of policy work and includes “research, data analysis, proposal development, consultation with stakeholders, formulation of advice for decision makers, guiding policy through governmental and parliamentary processes, and the subsequent evaluation of the outcomes of the policy” (Gregory & Lonti, 2008, p. 838). Broadening the policy process perspective on policy advice to include nonformulation policy work suggests additional advisory system dynamics, and extends the utility of such systems as arenas for the interaction between advisory units.

Second-wave approaches must also push further to confront the context within which such systems operate. Initial studies grappled with contextual concerns, but as already noted this primarily involved attention to politico-administrative and institutional governance arrangements (parliamentary/presidential systems), constraints

facing individual advisory suppliers (Fleischer, 2009; Fobé, Brans, Vancoppenolle, & Van Damme, 2013; Weaver & Stares, 2001), or the adaptive pressures on advisory demands and practices (Hajer, 2003; Parsons, 2004; Prince, 2007). Despite early acknowledgement that domain-specific variation was likely (Halligan, 1995; Prince, 1983), and subsystem prominence in the policy scholarship, treatments of advisory systems have to date been atheoretical in applying policy subsystems theory to advisory system dynamics. A clear difference between first and second wave approaches is then the conceptual and empirical use of policy subsystem theory to contextualize the boundaries within which advisory system activity occurs, illuminating how that context may shape advisory system component configuration, operation, and influence.

The policy process literature offers considerable promise in this regard. Scholars have usefully theorized how specific types of information and particular subsystems interact, or examined information-processing dynamics more generally (May et al., 2014; Weible, 2008; Workman, Jones, & Jochim, 2009). These approaches have to date typically focused only on discrete *types* of policy-relevant information.⁴ A significant advantage of advisory systems as a conceptual heuristic is the recognition that multiple types of policy advice exist and interact. Advisory systems studies are, therefore, complementary to these approaches. As macrolevel concepts put forth to array and assess relationships among *entire* sets of advisory components in a given jurisdiction, the question of which prevail, how they are configured in any given policy instance, and with what effect is a pressing research agenda. The following section sets out the rationale for the integration of policy network theory to advance advisory studies.

Integrating Subsystem Logic to Advance Advisory System Scholarship

The policy subsystems and advisory systems literature share many features. Both have sought to understand interest intermediation by examining the resource and power dependencies and exchanges between state and nonstate actors that characterize contemporary policymaking (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Knoke, Pappi, Broadbent, & Tsujinaka, 1996; Sabatier, 1987). Each has well-developed structural traditions that have emphasized membership composition and types of networks or systems (e.g., corporatist, pluralist, open vs. closed) (Atkinson & Coleman, 1989; Jordan & Schubert, 1992; Pierre, 1998). Additionally, both have ideational traditions that have sought to understand the role of policy ideas either in terms of (a)symmetry within policy networks and their subsystems; through supply and demand; or with respect to differences in the use, purpose, and effects of types of ideas or policy advice (Kisby, 2007; Peters & Barker, 1993; Prince, 2007). Despite these shared orientations, the literatures have not been well integrated, and leveraging subsystems scholarship offers opportunities to better specify advisory systems dynamics.

Regardless of the many terms used to define them: iron triangles, issue networks (Heclo, 1978), subgovernments (Berry, 1989; McCool, 1998), policy domains (Burstein, 1991; Laumann & Knoke, 1987), and policy monopolies (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993); subsystems remain a fundamental unit of analysis for policy theorists (Sabatier, 2007). Subsystem analysis is underpinned by a logic that understands

policymaking as the product of forms of public-private actor relations accruing in bounded policy areas. Specifically, subsystems are “semiautonomous decision making networks of policy participants that focus on a particular policy issue usually within a geographic boundary” (Sabatier, 1987). Initial subsystem scholarship focused on analysis of the constituent members and structural features of subsystems, for instance, seeking to conceptualize and test for the effects of pluralist and corporatist systems of interest intermediation (Atkinson & Coleman, 1992; Cashore & Vertinsky, 2000), the number and “cohesiveness” of members within such systems, or the “open” or “closed” nature of subsystems to various actors, and differences in network operation for policy outputs and outcomes (Jenkins-Smith, 1989; Jordan & Schubert, 1992; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). Well-known criticisms of the policy networks approach, particularly related to its lack of causal mechanisms and purely descriptive or “metaphorical” value have been put forward (Dowding, 1995; Peters, 1998). Others have, however, rebuked these criticisms pointing to the limited empirical evidence to support them (Kisby, 2007; Pappi & Henning, 1998), and empirical studies have linked subsystem configuration and operation to distinct patterns and propensities for policy change (Coleman, Skogstad, & Atkinson, 1996; Howlett & Ramesh, 1998).

Subsystems scholarship has also emphasized the function of ideas as key variables for policy subsystem configuration and operation (Hogl, Nordbeck, & Kvarda, 2009; Sabatier, 1988; Weible, 2008). The stability of subsystems along ideational lines has been linked with greater subsystem cohesion and status quo policy outcomes, whereas those characterized as “open” to new ideational inputs are less stable and more susceptible to subsystem adjustment, and nonincremental policy change (Freeman, 1985; Haas, 1975; Howlett & Ramesh, 2002; Verweij, Klijn, & Van Bueren, 2013; Williams, 2009). This line of inquiry has sought to understand what types of actors within subsystem boundaries hold what types of policy ideas; for example, distinguishing actors who are members of the “discourse community” from those who belong to the “policy/issue network” (Schmidt & Radaelli, 2004; see also Rhodes & Marsh, 1992). The discourse community is the larger and more accessible of the two, consisting of policy actors who have some limited knowledge of the policy issue at hand (Howlett, 2002; Singer, 1990); the policy network is the more restrictive, including members that are a subset of the discourse or epistemic community who participate in more frequent regularized exchanges with each other (Chadwick, 2000; Jordan & Maloney, 1997). The degree to which any given subsystem can resist or “insulate” itself from new ideational inputs is highly relevant (Howlett & Ramesh, 1998). This distinction facilitates understanding how ideational inputs are introduced or precluded from subsystems through assessments of the “symmetry” or compatibility between the policy ideas held by various sets of actors, with, for instance, ideationally driven policy change tied to the ability of discourse community members to successfully introduce new policy ideas into more restrictive policy network (Bradford, 1999; Fischer, 2003; Trachtenberg, 1983).

Using these two dimensions, the presence or absence of new ideas and membership, various subsystem typologies and classification schemes have been advanced.⁵ One version is set out in Table 2 including open, closed, resistant, and contested

Table 2. Policy Subsystem Configurations

Extent of Symmetry Between Network and Community	Network's Degree of Insulation from Community	
	High	Low
High	<i>Closed subsystem</i>	<i>Resistant subsystem</i>
Low	<i>Contested subsystem</i>	<i>Open subsystem</i>

Source: Howlett (2002).

subsystem types. Closed policy subsystems are those that are restricted to new actors as well as new ideational input. In contrast, those that are *open* are amenable to both new actors entering into the policy subsystems, as well as new ideational input. *Resistant* subsystems allow for new members but resist new ideational inputs or hold ossified ideational preferences. Finally, *contested* subsystems are characterized as closed, featuring a set membership, but where ideational preferences are not fixed and, therefore, susceptible to change.

Both advisory systems and policy subsystem scholarship, therefore, share a focus on questions of accessibility and the (in)compatibility of the policy ideas held among “sets” of pertinent actors. For advisory system scholarship, this raises important questions as to whether and how the dynamics of advisory systems differ by policy subsystem, and suggests some potential lines of inquiry related to why advisory system components combine in some instances but not others. We develop the notions of “accessibility” and “policy ideational compatibility” below to elaborate a typology of advisory system networks, the logic being that why advisory system components coalesce in networks is in part a question of their access to, and degree of ideational compatibility with, policy subsystems. We then postulate four archetypes of policy ideational compatibility to spur a more fine-grained analysis of what precisely is compatible, why, and how.

Advisory System Component Configuration and Domain-Specific Dynamics

Halligan's (1995) seminal work on advisory systems acknowledged that despite being macrolevel heuristics, advisory system operation and dynamics likely varied at sectoral level. As he puts it, “the structure of advice systems also varies between policy domains, e.g., scientists compared to the mainstream policy specialists [...] Variations in organizations and interest among policy sectors have come to be identified as different types of policy networks” (Halligan, 1995, p. 142). Moving advisory system scholarship forward can therefore benefit from thinking about their operation in different contexts, understood in this specific instance as policy sectors or domains, and the concomitant policy and public management implications (O'Toole & Meier, 2015; Pollitt, 2013; Torgerson, 1983).

Replacing first-wave spatial considerations with “accessibility” usefully pivots from locational concerns to analysis of whether policy advice has access to the respective policy subsystem; that is, how amendable a policy subsystem may be (e.g., open or closed) to receiving policy advice. This is not a radical departure given that initial advisory system thinking associated institutional arrangements like

parliamentary or presidential political systems with propensities for access. The former was typically presented as “closed,” exemplified by the U.K. parliamentary system, and the latter was suggested to be more “open,” as exemplified by the U.S. presidential system (Plowden, 1987). The logic is, however, improved when it is rescaled from institutional arrangements to particular policy domains. This better reflects findings that policy domain variance can exist within similar systems (Atkinson & Coleman, 1989; Burstein, 1991).⁶ A focus on accessibility is further justified given that locational considerations of internal versus external supply become moot in policy subsystems that are closed—for example, in policy domains such as national security that are often restricted to particular sets of participants as opposed to, for example, tourism policy subsystems, which are likely are more accessible (Nohrstedt, 2011). While distributional concerns as to “internal to government” supply may still be explored, here again the question should go beyond simply identifying the available internal supply, and its location, to questions of its purchase within subsystems.

Whether presented as government “control” of supply, or alignment among supply and demand, compatibility has always figured prominently in advisory system thinking. “Policy ideational compatibility” as introduced here, and developed further in the section below, is intended to more clearly identify what it is about policy advice that is (in)compatible with the prevailing policy subsystem. Public management’s focus on questions of public service politicization and deinstitutionalization dynamics is instructive here. As Di Francesco (2000, p. 36) put it in his review of public management reforms, “Policy advice systems across different governments have been subject to considerable reshaping over the last 15 years, primarily as a means for instituting “calibration” processes that make bureaucratic advice more responsive to the needs of ministers.” The dynamic here is then one of purposeful redesign that, at worst, contributed to the politicization of the public service, or at best constituted “calibration” to secure legitimate political “control” of public services.⁷ We contend that this is in fact a form of content or substantive calibration, but only one of many potential forms of compatibility.

For example, Weaver and Stares (2001), in their study of alternative policy advisory organizations (APAOs) use similar compatibility logic but operationalize compatibility differently. APAOs are organizations that are outside of government departments but nonetheless serve as institutionalized sources of policy expertise for government policymakers. APAO institutionalization suggests regularized and privileged patterns of interaction similar to those of policy subsystems, but institutionalization is a product of their provision of policy advice. Weaver and Stares maintain the locational distinction of others in that these bodies are “external” to government line departments, and arrayed by government/intermediate/civil society proximity categories. Importantly, their second dimension categorizes APAOs based on the “centrality” or “peripheral” *alignment* of APAO policy advice to a given organizational mission (Weaver & Stares, 2001), the logic being that it is the (in)compatibility between the advice being supplied and the “organizational mission” that determines its influence within advisory systems. This is of course well in line with notions of supply and demand congruence at the heart-of-market metaphor reviewed above.

Table 3. Advisory Networks

"Policy Analytical Compatibility"	Accessibility of Policy Subsystem	
	High	Low
High	<i>Collaborative Policy Advisory Network</i>	<i>Hegemonic Policy Advisory Network</i>
Low	<i>Contested Policy Advisory Network</i>	<i>Closed/Insulated Policy Advisory Network</i>

Crucially though, it distinguishes the basis of the alignment, or *what* is congruent, by specifying that it is an organizational goal rather than the ability of government to exert control or "pure" political preference. Despite differences in *what* it is that is compatible, a point we return to and expand on below, thinking about the "fit" or compatibility of policy advice components with the policy subsystem in question remains useful.

Table 3 uses these twin dimensions of policy ideational compatibility and access to set out four potential advisory network types. The intention here is to follow policy network theory that understands networks as subsets of policy subsystem actors that are privileged participants due to their resource endowments or authority (Henry, 2011; Leifeld, 2013; Zafonte & Sabatier, 1998). That is, there are advisory components *from the broader advisory system* that will or will not be active in advisory systems in particular policymaking circumstances (Di Francesco, 2001). However, as detailed below, the intention is to depart from exclusively ideational considerations prevalent in policy networks theory to identify additional potential drivers of advisory compatibility.

Collaborative advisory networks would be expected in instances where policy subsystems are "open" to policy advice and where there is a high degree of compatibility between the advisory components and the policy subsystem. That is, collaboration in this instance could involve multiple advisory components collaborating among themselves and with the prevailing policy subsystem components (e.g., public service, interest group, citizen advisory boards). For example, a tourism policy subsystem that was open to policy advice would collaborate in policy work with an advisory network—itsself also amenable to collaboration involving components within that network (e.g., small businesses, government[s], and interest groups).

Contested advisory networks would be expected to operate in policy subsystems that are accessible but where policy ideational compatibility is low; for instance, an environmental policy subsystem that was open and where agreement exists that climate change is a policy problem, but where instrumental preferences for noncarbon tax options predominate. In contrast, hegemonic advisory networks would be those where high policy ideational compatibility exists among subsystem and advisory network components, but where no access is granted for those seeking to provide alternative policy advice. Finally, closed policy advisory networks would be characterized by both low policy ideational compatibility between policy subsystems and advisory system components, and a lack of access to the policy subsystem. Questions of "alignment," "calibration," or policy ideational compatibility as we have styled it

here beg the question of *what* is compatible among policy advisory system components and policy subsystems.

This is clear in the network theory reviewed above that emphasized ideas. However, we contend that this perspective omits other important compatibility catalysts related to *why* and *how* compatibility is secured in advisory–policy subsystem interactions. The advisory networks set out are, therefore, only an initial step. Careful analysis is required to reveal what, why, and how policy advisory components are compatible in particular policy subsystems. We see this as an empirical question and have left it as such, in part given the exploratory nature of this article but also in recognition that context is likely a crucial variable, and due to network advisory studies, like policy network studies, being fundamentally a case study endeavor (Leifeld & Schneider, 2012). Below, based on public management and policy network theory, we postulate four policy ideational compatibility archetypes—content, purpose, issue, and relational—and their characteristics. These are in part compiled from the dominant features common in first-wave advisory system studies (Halligan, 1995; Plowden, 1987; Weaver & Stares, 2001), but we seek to make them explicit and subject to empirical verification. Others stem from more recent developments in policy and management scholarship. Together, they provide nuance to understand why policy advisory system components coalesce, and how their dynamics may differ in various policy circumstances.

Policy Ideational Compatibility Archetypes: Content, Purpose, and Issue Based

While policy-process-specific definitions of policy advice are often limited to “covering analysis of problems and the proposing of solutions” in first-wave studies (Halligan, 1998, p. 686), second-wave approaches require an appreciation of gains made in how policy work is understood along with various drivers of advisory system–policy subsystems compatibility. That is, second-wave studies must move past analysis of compatibility predicated on loosely defined congruence between supply and demand and opaque notions of government “control.” They must seek to clearly set out *what* it is about the policy advice that is compatible. Current efforts have started to turn to such questions with attention to content, temporality, process, and issue and country idiosyncratic variables in advisory work (Craft & Howlett, 2012; Howlett et al., 2014; Parsons, 2004; Peled, 2002). Typically, approaches examining content have conceived of it in relatively absolute terms or operationalize compatibility dynamics along a single dimension like the above “organizational goal” alignment (Weaver & Stares, 2001). We know, however, from policy and public management literatures that other factors may be involved. For instance, problem definition and goal setting, image/frame/narrative/discourse construction, instrument and program design and calibration, and variously organized types of “beliefs” have received detailed treatment (Béland, 2009; Campbell, 2002; Hall, 1993; Hecl, 1974; Mehta, 2011; Peters, 2000; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Schmidt, 2010). From ideationally oriented perspectives, policy advice depends not on the simple advancement of competing solutions, but rather an ongoing process of sense-making and

consensus formation during which interpretations of problems and potential solutions are discursively constructed and justified (Hoppe, 1999; Marsh, 1998). It is this consensus formation that forms the basis of compatibility in the second-wave approach advanced here. This better aligns with contemporary characterizations of policy advising as a dialectical, or even argumentative exchange (Fischer, 2003; Majone, 1989). This departs from the previously held notions of bilateral public service-elected official “speaking truth to power” (Wildavsky, 1979) to advisory modes more aptly characterized as the “weaving” of various forms of policy knowledge or “sharing truth with many actors of influence” (Parsons, 2004; Prince, 2007). This interactive and synergistic dynamic further supports the retention and revision of the advisory system concept as one arena for those exchanges and interactions.

A clear theme that cuts across content-based approaches is that various types of content considerations—understood as policy ideas—exist and operate at different levels. For instance, at their most abstract ideas have been conceived of and operationalized along overarching ideological/paradigmatic axes variously labeled as cognitive paradigms, worldviews, public sentiments, and philosophical ideas and zeitgeist or deep core beliefs (Campbell, 2002; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Skogstad & Schmidt, 2011; Surel, 2000). Less abstractly, ideas have also been operationalized and studied in terms of problem definition and policy solutions (Blyth, 2007; Mehta, 2011).

Like advisory systems, the advocacy coalition framework (ACF), multiple streams approach (MSA), and policy design approaches recognize different types of policy ideas and study their interaction. Policy design thinking pays great attention to the coherence among cascading aspects of macrolevel institutional arrangements, policy goals, and instrumental and programmatic calibration (Howlett, 2011; Schneider & Ingram, 1990). Most readers of this journal will be quite familiar with ACF’s approach where basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions are organized into a hierarchical “belief system” structure, with policy understood as translations of beliefs from competing coalitions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993).

Policy ideational compatibility is, however, not meant to reinvent the ACF or policy design wheel. It extends beyond designs’ focus on formulation and implementation to include all potential “stages” of policymaking that are themselves subject to advisory activity (Gregory & Lonti, 2008; Scott & Baehler, 2010). ACF and advisory systems share an interest in cognition and ideational functions of actors; however, ACF involves some assumptions that conflict with advisory systems thinking. For one, the ACF was designed to explain major policy change in policy subsystems dealing with issues that are both ideologically divisive and technically complex (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier, 2007). The ACF is less useful for policy advisory system application in instances in which there are policy subsystems without clear coalitions (May, 1989) or that feature a single dominant advocacy coalition (Stewart, 1991).⁸ Indeed, there is no certainty that coalitions exist in advisory systems, but rather that they may consist of a range of advisory units that may overlap or interact but not necessarily in a coordinated way, intent on advocacy, or with preferences for policy stability or change.

Additionally, ACF focuses on policy analysis or “technical policymaking information” and its function in policy-oriented learning, stability, and change (see Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Weible, 2008). As set out above, advisory networks may be adversarial but that is only one possibility. They may consist of a broader spectrum of policy advisory inputs, including strategic, political, operational, and instrumental types, in addition to traditionally conceived policy analysis (Boston, 1994; Prasser, 2006a; Weller, 1987). Content-based ideational compatibility, therefore, recognizes recent policy network studies that have empirically demonstrated differences in the types of information exchanged (e.g., “technical” vs. “strategic”) are consequential to tie formation and network operation (Leifeld & Schneider, 2012; Walker, Jung, & Boyne, 2013). Along similar lines the MSA approach that understands policymaking as the product of a coupling of political, policy, and problem streams also involves the interaction of various advisory units (Zahariadis, 2007; Zahariadis & Allen, 1995); for instance, suggesting potential for ideational compatibility dynamics within the policy stream itself, or with respect to the coupling of the streams more generally. Indeed, recent theoretical contributions have pointed precisely to future research using this approach as including “stream” configurations, styles, and even policy subsystem stream “types” (Howlett, McConnell, & Perl, 2015).

We can draw from these and extant policy and public management theory to develop other potential drivers of policy ideational compatibility. One potential driver is purpose. That is, what is it that decision makers intend to do or gain from using (or not) policy advice? Drawing from the research utilization literature, Weible (2008) instructively sets out three uses for information in policymaking: learning, political, and instrumental. These draw attention to the broader motivations that may compel actors or organizations to seek out information. Political uses of policy advice would include, for example, to support or legitimate existing or predetermined policy preferences, or in contentious policy debates (Sabatier, 1987; Wildavsky, 1979). Public management scholarship has long made clear linkages between the ideational motivations for public sector reforms, particularly those of the NPM ilk, given their attempts to increase “control” and policy responsiveness for elected political actors (Aucoin, 2008; Montpetit, 2011; Peters & Pierre, 2004; Savoie, 2003; Tupper, 2000). The use of appointed partisan advisers as executive instruments to provide political forms of policy advice, contest public service policy advice, and diversify the availability supplies for decision makers has also received attention by public management and policy scholars (Craft, 2015a, 2015b; Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010; OECD, 2011).

Learning is another well-explored theme and Weible’s (2008) overview of “expert information” and policy learning rightly points to clear subsystemic level effects and differences. We can add other forms of learning that are not predicated on “expert information” but common in policy and public management studies (Bennett & Howlett, 1992; May, 1992), the point being that policy ideational compatibility may be linked to purposeful *policy-relevant* learning. Last, following Weible (2008) we can theorize instrumental compatibility considerations where policy advice is used to directly affect policymaking. As Weible (2008, p. 620) puts it, “instrumental use is based on the rational, ideal approach to problem solving where a problem

Table 4. Policy Ideational Compatibility Archetypes

Content	Purpose	Issue	Relational
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy aims • Instruments • Programs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political • Learning • Instrumental • Procedural 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Salience • Complexity • Temporality 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trust • Capacity • Influence • Conflict

exists, research is conducted, and the decision follows the research findings.” A related but slightly distinct instrumental purpose could be procedural; that is, where particular policy advisory components are compatible because they are produced, or involve, favored processes such consultative or binding forms of policy advice (Fobé et al., 2013; Pierre, 1998).

The third compatibility archetype, shown in Table 4, deals with the nature of the policy issue. Recent work on issue expertise and information processing dynamics suggests that supply and demand dynamics of information (expert or otherwise) can be issue specific (May et al., 2014; Workman et al., 2009). The nature of the policy issue itself, its salience and complexity, are a few examples of issue specific criteria. Science and technology studies, for example, have developed a robust set of studies that have explored how particular scientific policy domains have given rise to different policy advisory dynamics with, for example, analysis of tensions and interactions between expertise and lay forms of advice (Collins, Weinel, & Evans, 2010), or with attempts to develop styles to capture enduring patterns or practices regarding the use of scientific advice in policymaking (Hoppe, 2005; Jasanoff, 2005; Renn, 1995). From a policy ideational compatibility perspective, this adds nuance to considerations of component compatibility. Indeed, studies have long detailed that issues with low political salience generate insufficient interest group inputs and may privilege public service expertise in policymaking (May, 1991; Montpetit, 2011).

A subsidiary contention related to salience is temporality. The predominance of “short-term” or “long-term,” “fire-fighting” or issues management versus “strategic” or “enlightenment” types of policy advisory activity and policy-relevant learning may give rise to compatibility preferences or advisory network configurations (Craft & Howlett, 2012; Weller, 1987). Additionally, issues of path dependence and feedback mechanisms may affect if and how policy advice is compatible with pre-existing advice or policy. This is a theme that has received some treatment in policy studies that have detailed longer-term patterns or “styles” of policy analysis and advice more generally (Howlett & Lindquist, 2004; Mayer et al., 2004). Temporality as a compatibility driver along stylistic lines or at individual policy domain levels is a ripe direction for future advisory system research.

A final potential archetype is relational. As per Table 4, trust, influence, degree of conflict, and policy “capacity”⁹ have been found to affect preference and tie formation, as well as resource exchanges in policy networks (Leifeld & Schneider, 2012; Weible & Sabatier, 2005). A growing body of public management and policy literature has looked at the implications of policy capacity shortages and public sector reforms designed to address them. Indeed, the policy analytical capacity literature

has focused on developing finer grained conceptual and empirical accounts of capacity at individual and organizational levels in various policy domains (Craft & Howlett, 2013b; Howlett et al., 2015; Tiernan, 2011). The propensity for compatibility of any one or more advisory components may, therefore, be potentially a matter of real or perceived capacity shortages.

Trust and influence among network actors have also been found to be significant for preference and tie formation in policy networks (Berardo & Scholz, 2010; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Kinne, 2013). For example, in ACF studies of complex policy subsystems resource endowments and influence can compel coordination among coalition actors that “have to get some advice/information and coordinate somewhat with influential affiliations—irrespective of beliefs” (Weible & Sabatier, 2005, p. 471). In sum, relational compatibility is multifaceted and may be a product of the resource or capacity exchange requirements, or a product of trust or influence that exists in policy subsystems for policy advice components (either as suppliers of policy advice or even an advisory process; e.g., consultations). These archetypes are constructs based on our reading of the policy and management literatures but content, purpose, issue, and relational policy ideational compatibility suggest that why and how policy advice may have influence, and how and why advisory system components coalesce, can vary beyond the ways in which current accounts detail.

Conclusion

Public management and policy theory will continue to grapple with how to understand and ensure optimal policy advisory practices. Advisory systems remain a useful heuristic to depict advisory components and to examine why they are influential. First-wave approaches provided excellent conceptual tools to trace shifts in the spatial distribution of policy advice, notably the plurality of advisory suppliers beyond the public service (Halligan, 1995; Pierre, 1998; Plowden, 1987). However, clear limitations in first-wave thinking have emerged linked to the weakened utility of spatial and control-autonomy criteria, along with significant transformations in the advisory landscape and governance practices and contexts (Di Francesco, 2001).

An initial step toward a second wave of scholarship has been taken here by reorienting the unit of analysis away from exclusive concerns on the public service to the systemic nature of advisory activity. This better reflects the configurations and compatibility dynamics that animate advisory system operation beyond those tied to the public service alone. We have also argued that context matters, particularly to address how advisory systems are organized and operate. While invoking context makes plain the complications and complexities for the public policy and management fields (see O'Toole & Meier, 2015; Pollitt, 2013). We have argued that moving from macrolevel to mesolevel analysis through domain-specific and policy-subsystemic analysis offers one avenue to theorize and empirically study the embedded nature of advisory systems, also recognizing that context is not only a domain-specific matter but also applies to the very nature of problem definition and consensus formation involving a plurality of policy actors, and the advisory activities

associated with a diverse array of policy work (Hajer, 2003; Howlett et al., 2014; Parsons, 2004; Torgerson, 1983).

Compatibility among adviser and advisee has been central to advisory system scholarship but underspecified (Goldhamer, 1978; Plowden, 1987). We have developed four archetypes of policy ideational compatibility based on advisory content, issue type, advisory purpose, and relational considerations to enable richer analysis of the sources and patterns of influence among the constituent elements of advisory systems (Fleischer, 2009; Halfman & Hoppe, 2005). Advisory systems have long been acknowledged to combine in different ratios in different policymaking situations (Bakvis, 1997; Fobé et al., 2013; Prince, 1983; Van Damme et al., 2011), but theory has lagged empirics. Given the centrality of policy advice to policymaking and public management, and the challenges to orthodox understandings of how that policy work is carried out, catching a second wave of advisory system scholarship offers significant opportunity to improve our understanding of how the components of such systems are configured, interact, and the contexts within which they operate.

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Notes

1. Following Johns (2006, p. 386) and O'Toole and Meier (2015), we understand context as those "situational opportunities and constraints that affect the occurrence and meaning of organizational behavior as well as functional relationships between variables." We recognize that this is a broad definition but leaving context as an empirical question allows for a range of potential contextual variables to affect advisory system structure and operation including country, organizational, or actor specific attributes along with the institutional and governance contexts within which policy activity occurs (Hajer, 2003). We operationalize one variable in this study, the policy domain, as a context within which advisory systems operate.
2. There is of course disagreement as to the objective analytical or value laden advocacy involved in advisory activities and a cornucopia of accounts delimiting *types* of policy advice such as strategic, technical, operational, instrumental (Boston, 1994; Plowden, 1987; Prasser, 2006a).
3. See Elgie (1997) for a discussion of some differences in, for example, countries with ministerial cabinet systems such as France and Belgium.
4. For example, Weible (2008, p. 615) distinguishes between "expert-based information," which he defines as "content generated by professional, scientific, and technical methods of inquiry" and "local information." May, Koski, and Stramp (2014) in contrast examine "issue expertise" in policymaking contending expertise extends beyond Weible's (2008) emphasis on scientific and technical forms. While expert-based inputs are included in advisory systems, they include a diversity of expert and nonexpert types of advisory inputs including but extending beyond technical or scientific policy activities (e.g., political feasibility, see Bakvis, 1997; Prasser, 2006b). We, therefore, do not assume that agents or institutions involved in the production or dissemination of policy advice are experts, or are substantively wedded to the specific information they convey. It is likewise along these lines that policy advisory systems are distinguished from epistemic communities (Haas, 1992, p. 18). From a network perspective, tie formation has also been qualified in that types of information exchanged (e.g., technical vs. "strategic") may serve different purposes (Leifeld & Schneider, 2012, p. 731).

5. See McCool (1998).
6. Collaboration can, however, be further specified in that it too may involve subsidiary accessibility considerations. The (neo)corporatism literature is instructive in this regard, highlighting that collaboration can itself be restricted to preferential patterns of interaction involving a diverse range of select groups, from the private or third sectors (Baccaro, 2003; Burns & Carson, 2002; Lembruch & Schmitter, 1977; Molina & Rhodes, 2002). Despite a controlled or uncontrolled pattern of collaboration, with various types of actors, the operating principles at work in such advisory networks would be characterized by the propensity for synergistic interaction of institutionalized advisory components among state and nonstate actors.
7. "Calibration" in this context should not be confused with adjustment to policy instrument settings, as it is sometimes used in the literature.
8. Policy scholars have tended to turn to theories of institutional stability to explain the policy-making process in such instances. For example, Baumgartner and Jones's (1993) punctuated equilibrium theory is premised upon the notion of structure-induced equilibrium derivative of "policy monopolies" over both the "policy image" (the definition of policy problems and appropriate solutions) and "policy venues" (jurisdiction over authoritative decision making) (see also Shepsle, 1979). Ostrom's (2005) approach to institutional analysis and development explains stability and change by investigating "institutional grammar" as reinforcing "rules in use" (see also Argyris & Schön, 1978).
9. There are many competing definitions of policy capacity (see Craft & Howlett, 2013b); for example, Honadle (1981, p. 578) defined it as "the ability to: anticipate and influence change; make informed, intelligent decisions about policy; develop programs to implement policy; attract and absorb resources; manage resources; and evaluate current activities to guide future action."

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